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Abstract 
In the nineties Argentina implemented a large education reform (Ley Federal de Educación – 
LFE) that mainly implied the extension of compulsory education in two additional years. The 
timing in the implementation substantially varied across provinces, providing a source of 
identification for unraveling the causal effect of the reform. The estimations from difference-in-
difference models suggest that the LFE had an overall positive although mild impact on education 
and labor outcomes. The impact on the income-deprived youths was small for education 
outcomes and null for labor outcomes.  
Resumen  
En los noventa Argentina implementó una reforma educativa (la Ley Federal de Educación – 
LFE) que implicó principalmente la extensión de la educación obligatoria en dos años 
adicionales. El timing en la implementación fue sustancialmente diferente entre provincias, lo 
cual provee una fuente de identificación del efecto causal de la reforma. Las estimaciones de 
modelos de diferencias dobles sugieren que la LFE tuvo un impacto global positivo pero 
moderado sobre los resultados educativos y laborales. El impacto sobre los jóvenes pobres fue 
pequeño en términos educativos y nulo en términos laborales.  
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1. Introduction 
In 1993 the Argentine Congress passed a law (Ley Federal de Educación, LFE 
henceforth) aimed at changing some important characteristics of the educational system. 
Chiefly among them, there was an extension in the years of compulsory education along 
with a change in the structure of the educational curricula. While in the previous system 
a child was obliged to attend seven years of primary school, under the new legislation 
that compulsory educational level was extended to nine years.  
By increasing the obligatory number of years of education, the government sought to 
force mostly poor children to increase their human capital accumulation, and induce 
some of them to continue studying in the secondary level, and hopefully into college. 
More educated youths are expected to perform better in the labor market, and hence 
have a lower probability of falling into poverty. While evidence on the relationship of time 
spent at school and improvements in the labor market is well established for developed 
countries, evidence for developing countries is much scarcer (Duflo, 2001, Galiani et al, 
2007, Madeira, 2005, Rodriguez, 2005).  
In this paper we evaluate the impact of the LFE on several educational and labor 
outcomes by exploiting the regional heterogeneity in the timing of the reform. Argentina 
is a federal country where primary and secondary public education are administered and 
financed at the provincial level. Although the LFE was a federal law to be complied with 
in all provinces, there was flexibility for state governments to decide on the timing of the 
reform. While in some provinces the reform was quickly implemented after the LFE was 
passed, in others the pace of the changes was slower. In fact, in some districts many 
central aspects of the reform were never implemented. 
Taking advantage of this source of variation in the exposition to the “treatment”, we 
study the impact on different educational and labor market outcomes. In particular, we 
are interested in evaluating whether poor youngsters who were forced to attend two 
additional school years were then more likely to finish high school, and performed better 
in the labor market.  
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The education reform is described in 
section 2. Section 3 presents the methodology and describes the data sources. Section 
4 presents the main results on the effects of the LFE on education and labor market 
variables. Finally, section 5 concludes. 
 
2. The Educational Reform 
In the early nineties Argentina decentralized the provision of schooling services, 
previously in hands of the federal government.1 The enactment of the Ley Federal de 
Educación (LFE) on April 14th, 1993 (Law 24195) introduced a second set of reforms, 
among which a significant change in the structure of the educational curricula and the 
                                                 
1
 Decentralization has been one of the main recent institutional innovations in development countries. The 
main idea behind decentralizations is to bring decision making closer to the citizens, so their preferences are 
better reflected in policies (Oates, 1972). Evidence for Latin America indicates that decentralization in the 
provision of schooling has increased (decreased) test scores in richer (poorer) districts for the case of 
Argentina (Galiani et al, 2007). For Brazil, decentralization had a positive effect on test scores too (Madeira, 
2006). Finally, for the case of Colombia (Rodriguez, 2006) results indicate that, once adjusting for the 
composition effect, test scores increased as a result of the decentralization. 
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extension of mandatory education stand out.2 While in the old system a child was 
obliged to attend seven years of primary school, under the new legislation that 
compulsory educational level was extended to nine years. In fact, the LFE implied the 
reorganization of the levels in which the educational system in Argentina is divided. The 
main changes were:  
 Pre-primary education for children aged five became compulsory.  
 The primary level, which comprised seven years in the previous law, was 
replaced by a nine-year level named Educación General Básica (EGB). 
 The five years of high school education were replaced by a three-year level 
called Polimodal.   
Table 1 shows the structure of the educational system before and after the reform. The 
first column reports the age in which the child/youth is supposed to be attending each 
level.  
One of the main goals of the LFE was reducing the high dropout rate in the initial years 
of secondary school, especially by poor students (Braslavsky, 1999).3 Under the new 
structure youths were “forced” (or encouraged) to stay two years more in school. 
Advocators of the LFE argued that this extension may also induce many of them to 
complete the, now shorter, high school level, and hopefully to get into the tertiary level. 
Other authors are more skeptical. Rivas (2003), among others, suggests that the 
increase in the enrollment rate during mandatory education may be compensated later 
with a higher dropout rate in the non compulsory stage. 
The increase in the years of compulsory education was accompanied by other 
institutional changes also aimed at keeping youths at school for longer. The change in 
the curricula included several specializations in the Polimodal which could be chosen by 
students according to their preferences, a system that could make the transition to 
higher education easier. Also, considering that the implementation of the reform was 
expected to induce an increasing pressure over the educational facilities, a budget of 
around US$ 3,000 million was allocated for an extensive program of investment in both 
educational infrastructure and training.  
An important point for our analysis is that the new legislation was implemented with a 
substantial variation in terms of timing and intensity across provinces. Argentina is a 
federal country where primary and secondary public education are administered and 
financed at the provincial level. Although the LFE was a federal law to be complied with 
in all provinces, there was flexibility for state governments to decide on the timing of the 
reform. In fact, provinces were allowed to phase the implementation of the reform along 
the period 1995-1999. While in some states the reforms were quickly and massively 
implemented, in others the changes were put into effect more gradually, involving a 
much smaller percentage of schools.4 Moreover, in some districts some central aspects 
of the reform were never implemented (city of Buenos Aires, and the province of Río 
                                                 
2
 This is a somehow different change that the one observed in developed countries, which increase the age 
for which school is mandatory. The policy in Argentina was to increase the number of compulsory years, 
regardless of age.  
3
 The year Congress passed the law, the net enrolment rate in secondary school was around 65% for all 
(urban) Argentina, while it was below 50% in the bottom quintile of the income distribution (CEDLAS, 2007). 
4
 See Rivas (2003) and Crosta (2008). 
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Negro). Table 2 reports for each province the year of implementation of the LFE and the 
modality (full, gradual, or null). By year 2000 the majority of the Argentina’s provinces 
were complying with the new legislation. 
The principal objective of the reform was to reduce the high dropout rates in the first 
years of high school and to contribute to improve labor market outcomes. There is a 
great deal of literature studying the effects of additional schooling on subsequent gains 
later in life, related mainly to labor market outcomes (Angrist and Kruger (1991) and 
Acemoglu and Angrist (2000) for the US, Walker (1995) for the UK and Oreopoulos 
(2007) for Canada). Also, there are some studies which look at other outcomes such as 
crime (Lochner and Moretti, 2004) and teen pregnancy (Black, Devereux and Salvanes, 
2004). However, as Oreopoulos (2007) states, these studies look at changes in 
compulsory schooling laws that took place many decades ago in developed countries 
and the studies affecting dropout at that time may be different from the ones affecting 
dropouts today. Furthermore, the above mentioned studies look at changes in the age a 
student should remain in school. Out paper looks at a somehow different change, since 
we examine the number of years that the individual must remain at school, regardless of 
her age. Duflo (2001) is one the main contributions to this literature for a developing 
country. She studies the effect of a large school construction program in Indonesia -
aimed at increasing enrollment in poor areas during the seventies- on labor market 
outcomes. Duflo (2001) focuses on elementary education. To the best of our knowledge, 
our study is the first one assessing the effect of an educational reform affecting students 
at older ages on labor market outcomes in a developing country.  
 
3. Methodology 
The implementation of the LFE was not accompanied by any strategy to evaluate its 
impact. This forces us to rely on observational data to derive our results. Our analysis 
seeks to identify the effect of the implementation of the LFE on several educational and 
labor outcomes by exploiting the variation in both the timing –early vs. late- and the 
intensity –full vs. gradual- of the reform across Argentine provinces.  
Figures 1 to 3 help to motivate this strategy. Figure 1 shows that while enrollment for 
children aged 6 to 12 remained almost universal during the period under analysis, 
enrollment rates for youths aged 13 to 15 substantially increased after provinces started 
implementing the reform in 1996. Figures 2 and 3 show enrollment rates for ages 13-15 
according to the timing (early vs. late) and degree (massive vs. gradual) of the 
implementation of the educational reform. Enrollment rates seem to have strongly 
increased for those youngsters living in areas where the LFE was quickly and fully 
implemented. 
One of the basic points of the paper is to evaluate whether youngsters who were 
affected by the LFE performed better in certain dimensions (e.g. the labor market) than 
their peers who were not “treated”, either because they were born in provinces that did 
not implement the reform quickly, or because they were not affected by the LFE as they 
were just leaving primary school when the law was passed.  
We use a difference-in-difference approach for our estimations. Specifically, we use 
fixed-effects methods to control for unobserved heterogeneity across both cohorts and 
urban areas. Essentially, fixed-effects identification strategy uses repeated observations 
of the unit of analysis to control for unchanged unobservable characteristics (in this case 
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by cohorts or urban areas) that can be correlated with both causal variables and 
outcomes of interest (Angrist and Krueger, 1998). Our strategy is similar to that of Duflo 
(2001), who analyzes the impact of an extended school construction program, using the 
interaction between cohort indicators and program intensity as an instrument for 
schooling. Formally, the basic model is: 
ijkijikjijk eTPXCY   ).*(    (1) 
where 
Yijk = outcome of interest of individual i, living in city j, belonging to cohort k. 
j  = city fixed effect  
k  = cohort fixed effect  
Xi  = individual characteristics  
Ti = treatment variable, equal to 1 if youngsters are treated according to both city and 
cohort, and 0 otherwise. 
Pj = measure of the program intensity in the city  
ijke  = error term. 
A key issue in this strategy is to identify which is the relevant geopolitical unit in order to 
determine the level of treatment. After the enactment of the LFE, the Argentina’s 
provinces chose whether to adhere or not to this national law and, in case they decided 
to implement the Reform, they had to select a starting date. The 23 Argentinean 
provinces and the city of Buenos Aires (Federal District) are listed in table 2, along with 
the year of implementation of the law. The practical execution of the LFE was not 
necessarily immediate. In fact, provinces decided whether to make a generalized 
implementation of the LFE since the beginning, or to follow a gradual strategy.  
We define different age cohorts that were exposed to the extension in compulsory 
education under the new curricula. Besides, there is substantial variability in terms of 
treatment intensity among the young cohorts. This variability is driven by two main 
sources. In the first place, differences in the timing of the reform involve that a given 
cohort could have been exposed to a variable extension in mandatory education 
according to their city of residence. Second, differences in school construction rates 
and/or percentage of schools that implemented the reform are another source of 
variability in the program exposure. Children living in two provinces that implemented the 
reform in the same year (e.g. Buenos Aires and Córdoba) could be exposed to 
considerably different treatment intensities in accordance with the investment program 
carried out to support these reforms. 
 
Outcome variables  
We are interested in measuring the impact of the LFE on human capital accumulation 
and labor market performance. Clearly, these aspects are strongly linked since more 
educated youngsters are expected to perform better in the labor market.  
Regarding human capital accumulation, we study whether the law was effective in 
retaining youths in the educational system beyond the compulsory level. As outcome 
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indicators we consider years of formal education and secondary school graduation. With 
respect to the labor market performance of students, the main outcomes considered are 
earnings, hours worked, and employment.  
 
Data 
Our primary source of information is the Encuesta Permanente de Hogares (EPH) from 
2003 to 2006, the main household survey in Argentina. The EPH covers 32 urban areas, 
with at least one observation in the 24 Argentina’s provinces listed in table 2. Although 
the EPH covers only urban population, and hence it is not nationally representative, the 
share of rural population in Argentina is, unlike most developing countries, small (13%). 
The EPH gathers information on individual’s socio-demographic characteristics, 
employment status, hours of work, wages, incomes, type of job, and education. The 
EPH includes information on about 100,000 individuals.  
Though the units of observation in our research are the individuals, the sources of 
variability in exposition to treatment are both their city of residence and cohorts. Data 
regarding exposition to treatment (percentage of schools that implemented the reform or 
school construction to allow the extension in compulsory education) are obtained from 
the administrative records of the Argentine National Education Ministry.  
 
Exogeneity  
One of the major methodological concerns about the approaches that exploit the 
regional variability in the timing or intensity of a policy intervention is that the choice of 
the local governments as to when and how to implement the reform may be correlated 
with unobservable factors which also affect outcomes. In our case, for instance, one may 
conjecture that poorer provinces with lower enrollment rates could have been more 
eager to put into effect the changes, since they will be granted resources from the 
central government.  
In order to better understand the timing of the implementation of the LFE, we estimate a 
hazard model (Jenkins, 1995) of the probability of implementing the reform. We are 
interested in examining whether there are factors which could be affecting labor 
market/educational outcomes and the probability of implementing the reform. In table 3 
we present our estimates of the hazard model. We model the probability that a province 
implements the reform at a given period of time as a function of time varying provincial 
variables. There are several specifications for the left-hand variable and for the time 
variables.5 Among the explanatory variables we consider proxies for regional GDP (gdp), 
Gini coefficient (Gini), unemployment (Desempleo), population (Poblac), fiscal deficit 
(Resultado fiscal), political party (polity), which takes the value of 1 if the province is 
governed by the same party than the national government at the time of reform, and the 
percentage of individual with unmet basic needs (NBI).  
The only variable that is significant in most of the specifications is the political party, 
which means that the provinces were more likely to implement the LFE if its ruling party 
was the same than the national one. Given this, we control for this variable in our 
estimations. The rest of the variables, which are correlated with economic shocks and 
                                                 
5
 We considered “implementation” to several different thresholds: 33% percent of implementation and 90% 
of implementation of EGB and Polimodal. 
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could be also correlated with our outcome variables of interest are uncorrelated with the 
probability of reform. If the reform is uncorrelated with observed time varying factors, it is 
less likely that it is correlated with unobserved time varying factors which could be 
affecting also our outcomes of interests.  
As mentioned above, our identification assumption is that in the absence of the reform, 
educational and labor outcome measures would not systematically differ across 
provinces which implemented and the ones that not. If this is the case, then the 
difference in outcomes observed between exposed and non exposed cohorts/regions 
are attributable to the educational reform.  
Table 4 performs some checks in order to support our identification strategy.6 Based on 
individuals’ ages and region of residence we can split our sample according to 
exposition to reform. In Panel I we examine the simple difference in years of education 
between provinces which implemented massively vs. the ones who did not. While young 
cohorts are the ones exposed to the new law, old cohorts are not since they were born 
before they could be affected by the educational reform. The double difference between 
these two groups amounts to 0.91 years of education and it is statistically significant. 
Panel II and III show differences by the degree of implementation by age cohorts who 
should not have been affected by the reform. In both panels both groups (young and old) 
are comprised by people not exposed to the reform. The double difference in both 
panels is not statistically significant. This supports our claim that our results are driven 
by the reform under study and not by other factors.  
 
4. Education and labor market outcomes 
We carry out the estimations using several samples and different cohorts’ definitions. 
The samples we consider are the following: all individuals, males, poor, and poor males.7 
We conduct our estimations for three different definitions of cohorts in order to give more 
robustness to our estimates (see table 5). As left-hand-side variables, we consider two 
education variables - years of education and a dummy for complete high school – and a 
set of labor variables - labor income, weekly hours worked, and a dummy for employed.  
 
Education outcomes  
Tables 6 and 7 show the results for the education variables from two models; the effect 
of the reform is captured by the interaction of a dummy identifying the “young cohorts” 
(i.e. those individuals young enough to be exposed to the reform) with a variable 
measuring the intensity of the reform. In the first one the intensity of the reform is 
introduced through a single binary variable (=1 for those individuals living a city that 
massively implemented the LFE), while in the second one the intensity of the reform is 
measured by the share of schools that had adopted the reform by 1998 in the area 
where the individual lives. Results vary more across samples than across definitions of 
cohort. Results do not qualitatively change if we consider other measures for reform 
intensity (e.g. school construction). Besides the typical set of controls, we also include 
political party in the regressions, given its significance in the hazard models of table 3. 
                                                 
6
 This analysis follows closely the one in Duflo (2001). 
7
 We consider a person to be poor if (s)he belongs to the bottom three quintiles of the household equivalent 
income distribution. 
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The LFE seems to have had a significant effect on some basic school enrollment 
outcomes. The coefficients of the treatment variable indicator (interaction of age in 1996 
and treatment variable) are positive and significant for all samples and cohort definitions. 
Youths fully exposed to the LFE ended up with more years of education than those not 
fully exposed to the reform. Coefficients range from 0.3 to 0.8 extra years of education 
as a result of the reform. Moreover, most coefficients are also positive and significant in 
the case of the binary variable for complete high school. In particular they are positive for 
poor people, implying at least a partial success of the reform: poor youngsters exposed 
to the reform ended up with better educational outcomes than those not fully exposed to 
the reform. The impact, however, seems small: education for those poor youths fully 
exposed to the LFE increased in about just half a year. The increase is somewhat larger 
for the sample of all people. One possibility beyond this result is that the reform caused 
some poor teenagers to finish high school, but few of them to go beyond that. Instead, 
the impact could have been more intense on non-poor youths, who probably live in an 
environment more prone to education, and have higher opportunities to continue 
studying.  
The impact of the reform on educational outcomes seems to have been higher for males 
than for females. This is consistent with the fact that in Argentina, as in most of Latin 
American countries, high-school drop-out rates are higher for men than for women. 
CEDLAS (2009) reports that in 2006 while 84% of females in secondary school age are 
attending that educational level, the share for males is 78%.  
Figure 4 shows coefficients for the interaction of age in year 1996 and treatment when 
taking years of education as the outcome variable. As expected, coefficients are positive 
and significant for children aged 8 to 12 years (i.e. those fully exposed to the LFE), and 
become non-significant after the age of 12 (i.e. for those youths that were finishing or 
had finished primary school at the time the reform was implemented).  
 
Labor outcomes  
The impact of the education reform on labor outcomes can be studied with the help of 
tables 8 and 9. When introducing the reform as a binary variable the results in terms of 
labor market outcomes are mostly positive and statistically significant. Youths fully 
exposed to the reform when they were teenagers have now higher probability of being 
employed, work more hours and earn higher incomes. The reform increased the 
probability of employment for all individuals and for the group of males. The probability of 
employment in those groups increases between 4.9 and 7.4%. The effect for poor 
individuals and poor males is also positive, but in most cases not statistically significant 
at the conventional levels.  
Labor incomes for treated youths are around 10% higher than for their non-treated 
counterparts. Results are similar for the sample of males, but almost completely vanish 
in the sample of poor youths. The reform seems to have had no effect on the labor 
outcomes of income-deprived people. Most results are also non-significant when 
considering the intensity of treatment (table 9). Positive and significant coefficients 
remain only for the sample of all youths and definition of cohort C. Again, all results for 
the poor are non-significant. The same pattern observed for employment is observed for 
hours worked. While the entire sample and all males increased their hours worked per 
week between 2.28 and 3.53, the effect for poor individuals is negligible and not 
statistically significant. For an average working week of 35 hours, the increase in hours 
amounts from 8 to 10%.  
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In summary, the reform seems to have had an overall positive impact on education and 
labor outcomes. On average, youths fully exposed to the LFE have more years of 
education, were more likely to have completed secondary school, have higher probability 
of finding a job, work more hours and earn higher salaries. However, the effects are in 
general rather small and some of them do not hold in all specifications. In addition, and 
more important, the impact of the reform on the income-deprived youths is small for 
education outcomes and null for labor outcomes. Relatively few poor teenagers exposed 
to the reform managed to increase high-school education, with apparently no impact on 
their labor outcomes.  
One possible explanation for the differences across groups runs as follows. Poor people 
have very limited access to jobs with high returns to education. Most of them are 
construction workers, domestic servants, or are self-employed in the commerce sector. 
The environment where they grow (low social capital, scarce contacts) implies a 
substantial constraint to the access to jobs where education makes a big difference. As 
the reform implied only small gains in years of education, the impact on the performance 
in the labor market for these people was understandably low. In contrast, the educational 
gains were larger for the non-poor given the types of jobs that these people are more 
likely to hold (e.g. civil servants).    
5. Conclusions  
High dropout rates in developing countries have long motivated changes in educational 
systems in order to keep individuals in school. In most developing countries, education 
still remains an important policy for leveling off different labor market opportunities. While 
evidence on the (sometimes causal) relationship of time spent at school and 
improvements in labor market is well established for developed countries, evidence for 
developing countries is much scarcer. It is believed, however, that increasing the 
average years of education for individuals will enhance their labor market opportunities. 
While it is very difficult to legally enforce the number of compulsory years, it is believed 
that reforms raising the number of compulsory years and/or school leaving age are 
effective. Different channels may be behind this. Among them we can mention 
(Oreopoulos 2009) social norms and the stigma caused by not fulfilling what should be 
mandatory. For the case of Argentina, we believe that the most pressing concern is the 
difficulty of finding a job in the formal sector without the legal educational requirements.  
Argentina, while still one of the countries with the greater number of years of education 
in Latin America, still presents a high dropout rate after elementary school, especially for 
poorer individuals. Henceforth, the reform under analysis here, among other changes, 
aimed at increasing the average number of compulsory years at school.  
In spite of the heated debate about the educational reform in Argentina, there has not 
been solid evidence of its causal effect on educational and labor market outcomes. This 
paper contributes to the measurement of the impact of the LFE in different dimensions. 
Our analysis takes advantage of the variation both of the timing –early vs. late- and the 
intensity –full vs. gradual- of the reform across Argentine provinces.  
Our results suggests positive effects of the reform in some educational outcomes (years 
of education and high school completion) and labor outcomes (employment, hours and 
labor income). However the LFE seems to have been only partially successful, as the 
impact on the income-deprived youths was small for education outcomes and null for 
labor outcomes. 
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Table 1 
Educational structure before and after the reform  
Before the LFE After the LFE
Age Levels Year Compulsory? Levels Year Compulsory?
3 Pre-primary 1 No Pre-primary 1 No
4 Pre-primary 2 No Pre-primary 2 No
5 Pre-primary 3 No Pre-primary 3 Yes
6 Primary 1 Yes EGB 1 Yes
7 Primary 2 Yes EGB 2 Yes
8 Primary 3 Yes EGB 3 Yes
9 Primary 4 Yes EGB 4 Yes
10 Primary 5 Yes EGB 5 Yes
11 Primary 6 Yes EGB 6 Yes
12 Primary 7 Yes EGB 7 Yes
13 Secondary 1 No EGB 8 Yes
14 Secondary 2 No EGB 9 Yes
15 Secondary 3 No Polimodal 1 No
16 Secondary 4 No Polimodal 2 No
17 Secondary 5 No Polimodal 3 No  
 
 
Table 2 
The process of LFE implementation  
Province Year Degree
Buenos Aires 1996 F
Catamarca 1999 G
City of Buenos Aires N.I
Chaco 1997 G
Chubut 1999 G
Córdoba 1996 F
Corrientes 1997 F
Entre Ríos 1997 F
Formosa 1998 F
Jujuy 1998 G
La Pampa 1997 F
La Rioja 1999 G
Mendoza 2000 G
Misiones 1998 F
Neuquén 1998 G
Río Negro N.I
Salta 1998 G
San Juan 1997 F
San Luis 1998 F
Santa Cruz 1998 F
Santa Fé 1997 F
Santiago del Estero 1998 F
Tierra del Fuego 1998 G
Tucumán 1998 F  
Source: Crosta (2007) 
N.I: not implemented 
F: full implementation since the beginning 
G: gradual implementation 
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Table 3 
Hazard model  
Time of implementation  
 
Dependent variable
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
pbg -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.000] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001]
gini 0.607 -15,299 4,650 -8,219 -28.235* -52.549** -10,541 -27,035
[11.691] [14.903] [14.009] [18.726] [14.433] [23.218] [15.655] [21.443]
desempleo 0.074 -0.031 0.137 0.243* 0.120 -0.170 -0.067 -0.216*
[0.071] [0.080] [0.100] [0.135] [0.097] [0.159] [0.085] [0.120]
polity -0.088 0.341 1.705** 2.349** 2.096** 0.509 2.134** 3.019***
[0.603] [0.664] [0.758] [0.947] [0.843] [1.185] [0.840] [1.153]
poblac 0.005 0.019 0.005 -0.044 0.026 0.055 0.005 0.024
[0.018] [0.016] [0.029] [0.037] [0.036] [0.035] [0.017] [0.026]
Resultado Fiscal -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.005** 0.000 0.002 -0.002 -0.000
[0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.004] [0.002] [0.003]
lnt 1,224 2,690 1.401** 1.662*
[0.772] [1.763] [0.621] [0.858]
nbi 0.024 0.044 -0.083 -0.080 0.110** 0.125** 0.099* 0.128
[0.049] [0.056] [0.054] [0.058] [0.044] [0.061] [0.060] [0.083]
d2 19.936*** 18.015** 17,484 18.067**
[2.135] [8.230] [0.000] [7.813]
d4 18,552 14,998 21.074*** 17.409**
[0.000] [9.380] [1.571] [7.976]
d5 22.078*** 19.406** 22.789*** 19.997**
[1.892] [8.762] [1.811] [7.926]
d6 23.186*** 21.310** 22.350*** 23.514***
[1.930] [8.818] [2.252] [8.527]
d7 22.620*** 21.432** 24.089*** 23.913***
[2.256] [8.552] [2.596] [8.560]
d9 22.508*** 23.488**
[2.468] [9.174]
Constant -5,340 -16.769*** -8716 -18830 3328 0.027 -3,284 -13,930
[4.925] [6.182] [7.193] [0.000] [5.839] [10.396] [5.947] [0.000]
Observations 141 141 181 181 96 96 131 131
Standard errors in brackets
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Model (1) has a time trend 
Model (2) has temporal dummies.
33% polimodal implemented 90% polimodal implemented 33% EGB implemented 90% EGB implemented
 
Source: own calculations based on microdata from EPH (INDEC).  
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Table 4 
Experiment of interest 
Years of education  
Panel I 
Intensive  Non-Intensive  Difference 
Young 10.183 10.5 -0.317 
[00] [00] [0.044] 
Old 10.991 12.218 -1.227 
[00] [0.001] [0.063] 
Difference -0.809 -1.718 0.91 
[0.043] [0.054] [0.077] 
Note: standards erros between brackets  
Control experiment 1 
Years of education  
Panel II 
Intensive  Non-Intensive  Difference 
Young 9.425 10.452 -1.026 
[00] [0.001] [0.074] 
Old 9.118 10.217 -1.098 
[00] [0.001] [0.082] 
Difference 0.307 0.235 0.072 
[0.055] [0.079] [0.11] 
Note: standards erros between brackets  
Young= 19 20 21 22 23 
Old= 24 25 26 27 28 
Control experiment 2 
Years of education  
Panel III 
Intensive  Non-Intensive  Difference 
Young 9.849 11.076 -1.227 
[0.001] [0.001] [0.086] 
Old 9.49 10.515 -1.026 
[0.001] [0.001] [0.096] 
Difference 0.36 0.561 -0.202 
[0.066] [0.089] [0.129] 
Note: standards erros between brackets  
Young= 16, 17, 18 
Old= 20, 21, 22 
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Table 5 
Cohorts  
Name Ages
Cohort A
Young 8,9,10,11,12
Old 14, 15, 16, 17, 18
Cohort B
Young 8,9,10,11
Old 15, 16, 17, 18
Cohort C
Young 11, 12, 13
Old 14, 15, 16  
Note: age in 1996.  
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Table 6 
Impact of educational reform on educational outcomes 
Binary variable for reform 
Cohort A Cohort B Cohort C Cohort A Cohort B Cohort C
All 0.733*** 0.787*** 0.471*** 0.023 0.026* 0.034***
[0.179] [0.204] [0.097] [0.015] [0.015] [0.013]
Observations 59449 47339 35850 59996 47797 36084
Males 0.785*** 0.845*** 0.606*** 0.028 0.034* 0.036**
[0.184] [0.217] [0.108] [0.019] [0.020] [0.018]
Observations 29128 23213 17693 29429 23466 17821
All Poor 0.472*** 0.527*** 0.291*** 0.068*** 0.076*** 0.074***
[0.134] [0.160] [0.070] [0.019] [0.022] [0.015]
Observations 32485 26002 19065 32850 26302 19229
Poor males 0.546*** 0.605*** 0.368*** 0.072*** 0.083*** 0.082***
[0.132] [0.163] [0.102] [0.020] [0.026] [0.018]
Observations 15521 12446 9085 15722 12612 9176
Clustered standard errors in brackets
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
All regressions include city and cohort fixed effects
Years of educaion Complete Highschool
 
Source: own calculations based on microdata from EPH (INDEC).  
 
Table 7 
Impact of educational reform on educational outcomes 
Intensity of reform=share reformed schools 
Cohort A Cohort B Cohort C Cohort A Cohort B Cohort C
All 0.007*** 0.008*** 0.005*** 0.00 0.00 0.000**
[0.002] [0.002] [0.001] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Observations 59449 47339 35850 59996 47797 36084
Males 0.008*** 0.009*** 0.006*** 0 0 0
[0.002] [0.002] [0.001] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Observations 29128 23213 17693 29429 23466 17821
All Poor 0.005*** 0.006*** 0.003*** 0.001** 0.001*** 0.001***
[0.002] [0.002] [0.001] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Observations 32485 26002 19065 32850 26302 19229
Poor males 0.006*** 0.007*** 0.004*** 0.000* 0.001* 0.001***
[0.001] [0.002] [0.001] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Observations 15521 12446 9085 15722 12612 9176
Clustered standard errors in brackets
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
All regressions include city and cohort fixed effects
Years of educaion Complete Highschool
 
Source: own calculations based on microdata from EPH (INDEC).  
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Table 8 
Impact of educational reform on labor outcomes 
Binary variable for reform 
Cohort A Cohort B Cohort C Cohort A Cohort B Cohort C Cohort A Cohort B Cohort C
All 0.063** 0.074** 0.049** 3.093*** 3.261** 2.280*** 0.139*** 0.152*** 0.135***
[0.029] [0.034] [0.020] [1.132] [1.328] [0.770] [0.041] [0.037] [0.044]
Observations 59998 47799 36083 59998 47799 36083 15703 12390 10427
Males 0.058* 0.065* 0.058** 3.170** 3.239** 3.552*** 0.194*** 0.223*** 0.203***
[0.030] [0.037] [0.023] [1.272] [1.504] [1.204] [0.038] [0.038] [0.050]
Observations 29431 23468 17820 29431 23468 17820 9742 7692 6474
All Poor 0.034 0.03 0.036** 1.063 1.01 0.371 -0.007 0.028 0.031
[0.026] [0.029] [0.018] [1.035] [1.151] [1.067] [0.046] [0.052] [0.061]
Observations 32852 26304 19229 32852 26304 19229 9150 7149 6098
Poor males 0.044 0.032 0.053 1.921 1.656 1.232 0.051 0.118*** 0.051
[0.033] [0.034] [0.035] [1.423] [1.629] [1.839] [0.048] [0.043] [0.053]
Observations 15724 12614 9176 15724 12614 9176 5941 4666 3928
Clustered standard errors in brackets
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
All regressions include city and cohort fixed effects
Employed hours worked labor income
 
Source: own calculations based on microdata from EPH (INDEC).  
 
Table 9 
Impact of educational reform on labor outcomes 
Intensity of reform=share reformed schools 
Cohort A Cohort B Cohort C Cohort A Cohort B Cohort C Cohort A Cohort B Cohort C
All 0.001 0.001 0.001** 0.021 0.021 0.020** 0.001 0.001* 0.001***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.014] [0.017] [0.009] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Observations 59998 47799 36083 59998 47799 36083 15703 12390 10427
Males 0.001 0.001 0.001** 0.023 0.02 0.029* 0.001** 0.002*** 0.002***
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.018] [0.021] [0.015] [0.001] [0.000] [0.001]
Observations 29431 23468 17820 29431 23468 17820 9742 7692 6474
All Poor 0 0 0 0.006 0.008 0.001 0 0 0.001*
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.014] [0.016] [0.014] [0.000] [0.000] [0.001]
Observations 32852 26304 19229 32852 26304 19229 9150 7149 6098
Poor males 0 0 0 0.008 0.006 -0.003 0 0.001* 0.001
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.019] [0.022] [0.023] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Observations 15724 12614 9176 15724 12614 9176 5941 4666 3928
Clustered standard errors in brackets
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
All regressions include city and cohort fixed effects
Employed hours worked labor income
 
Source: own calculations based on microdata from EPH (INDEC).  
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Figure 1 
Gross enrollment rates by age group  
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Source: own calculations based on microdata from EPH (INDEC).  
 
Figure 2 
Gross enrollment rates by timing of the reform  
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Source: own calculations based on microdata from EPH (INDEC).  
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Figure 3 
Gross enrollment rates by degree of the reform 
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Source: own calculations based on microdata from EPH (INDEC).  
 
 
 
 
Figure 4 
Coefficients of the interaction of age in 1996 with program intensity in the province 
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Source: own calculations based on microdata from EPH (INDEC).  
 
 
